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1 Introduction
The central themes of this paper are best illustrated by a single chart.
Figure 1 shows that the ratio of Indian to US per capita output over the
past 45 years has displayed a distinctive "V"-shaped pattern. Until the
1980s India’s output growth was systematically lower than that of the US;
subsequently it has been systematically higher. Taken as a whole India has
now been clearly converging for at least two decades.
This remarkable turnaround in growth has not been uniformly distrib-
uted, whether across sectors or across states. However, we show in this
paper that a strikingly similar V-shaped pattern is visible not just in ag-
gregate output ﬁgures, but also as the primary determinant of long-term
movements in the cross-sectional distribution within the All-India total, at
both sectoral and state output levels. Following Bai (2004) and Bai and
Ng (2002; 2004) we identify common factors determining long-term growth
performance by Principal Components analysis of log output levels. This
displays two clearly dominant factors: a common long-term growth factor
and a common "V-factor", that appear jointly to capture the permanent
components of output per capita, disaggregated both by state and by major
industry group over the same period. The common "V-Factor" broadly re-
sembles the series shown in Figure 1. Using these two factors we can identify
with some degree of conﬁdence both "V-States" and "V-Sectors": i.e, those
2with a positive loading on the V-Factor.
Our analysis has three major strands:
1. We carry out a principal components based sectoral growth accounting
exercise that focuses on the contributions of the ﬁrst two principal
components to the long-term growth performance of the Indian States
both at the aggregate and sectoral level. One key conclusion we draw
is that "V-States" have not been systematically either richer or poorer
than Non-V states. Unsurprisingly, the V-States have been those with
a preponderance of V-sectors. In line with other past research, we
ﬁnd that the most marked "V"s are visible in the service sector; but
manufacturing has also made important V-factor contributions in some
states. In general, the V-factor makes smaller contributions to long-
term growth of agriculture.
2. Our analysis also casts some light on the debate on when the turn-
around in growth took place. The aggregate ﬁgure shown in Figure 1
suggests (roughly in line with the ﬁndings of Rodrik and Subramanian
(2005) and others, that the low-point of the V was right at the start
of the 1980s - at a time which is hard to rationalize in terms of policy
changes. In conrast our more disaggregated analysis typically produce
estimates of the V-Factor that have a low-point distinctly later in the
1980s, and thus are more readily explicable in terms of policy changes.
However, we would be cautious in drawing too precise an inference on
this issue. The data provide much stronger evidence for the existence
of a long-term V-factor than they do for the precise location of its
apex, which can appear to shift by several years simply on the basis
of which particular dataset is used.
3. A ﬁnal, more preliminary and speculative component of our analysis
relates to the nature of the V-Factor itself. Its ubiquity suggests a
strong common element, which it seems reasonable to ascribe to pol-
icy changes. But the open question is why policy changes that were
common across states appear to have had such uneven, and sustained
uneven eﬀects. We certainly do not claim to have found a causal
explanation, but can at least point to two striking correlations with
the V-Factor. The ﬁrst is that the public sector, whether deﬁned
in terms of output, or in terms of development expenditures, shows
3strong evidence of being negatively correlated with the V-Factor, i.e.,
is "Anti-V" This is consistent with the ﬁndings of some earlier re-
search.1 The second is the role of supply constraints which may have
limited the impact of the V-Factor in some states. Both features of the
data suggest that diﬀerential loadings on the V-Factor do not reﬂect
movements in long-term conditional steady-state levels of output; but
rather in diﬀerential levels of frictions that impede movements towards
that steady-state.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we relate our
analyis to recent literature; Section 3 summarises the key features of the
dataset. In Sections 4 and 5 we derive estimates of the V-factor from the
method of principal components applied to statewise output both at total
and sectoral levels. In Section 6 we contrast the timing of the turnaround
in our estimated V-factors with the timing suggested in past research. In
Section 7 we provide some preliminary evidence of correlates of the V-Factor;
and in Section 8 we attempt to reconcile the V-factor representation with
a benchmark model of convergence. Section 9 concludes the paper, while
appendices provide additional background detail.
2 Related Literature
This paper can be related to two broad strands of past research. The ﬁrst
examines the sources and timing of the shift in Indian output growth since
the 1980s; a second examines the longer-term issue of convergence between
the Indian states.
There has been a recent surge of research on the timing and proximate
causes of structural breaks in India’s growth rate. This literature addresses
a range of questions, such as: When was the shift in growth? Was it policy
driven? If so, what were the crucial policy changes that drove growth? Was
the shift uniform across states? Our results shed light on some of these
questions.
Virmani (2006) ﬁnds that the upward break in growth in the manufac-
turing sector is responsible for the structural break in growth. In particular,
1 Clark and Wolcott (2003) also show that several measurable dimensions of state policy
such as the number of phones per 100 workers, the number of kilometers of roads per 100
workers, public education expenditure per 100 workers, or public capital expenditure per
100 workers show little sign of connection with economic growth.
4he ﬁnds that the growth rate of manufacturing accelerates after 1980-81.
This contributes to the acceleration in growth of GDP growth from 1981-82
(p. 92). Virmani also ﬁnds no additional breakpoints in the nineties, once
the breakpoint in 1980-81 is accounted for.2 There are two aspects of his re-
sults that are worthy of note. First, Virmani ﬁnds that 45% of the variation
in India’s growth rate is explained by ﬂuctuations in rainfall. He uses this
fnding to net out the eﬀect of rainfall variation on GDP growth.3 Second,
he uses a standard Chow test to determine structural breaks. However, as
noted by Hansen (2001), this approach is problematical since the break-date
must be known in advance to the researcher. In the case that the researcher
picks an arbitrary candidate break-date, the true break-date can be missed.
If the researcher picks a break-date based on some known feature of the data,
the Chow test is misleading since the candidate break-date is endogenous.
Balakrishnan and Parameswaran (2007) utilize the approach developed
by Bai and Perron (1998) and Bai (2003) which allows for the simultaneous
and endogenous estimation of break-dates. In contrast to Virmani (2006),
Balakrishnan and Parameswaran (2007) ﬁnd that the break in growth the
rate of GDP occurs in 1978-79 —with the 1978-79 take oﬀ in growth occurring
prior to the positive break in manufacturing (1982-83). This suggests that
the evidence for manufacturing having served as a primary engine of growth
through appropriate market reforms is weak.4
Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) argue — in similar vein to Virmani
(2006) — that the improvement in India’s economic performance was driven
by policy changes. In particular, Rodrik and Subramanian argue that the
trigger for India’s upward break in growth — which they pin down to around
1980 — occurs because of an "attitudinal shift" on the part of the national
government in 1980 in favor of businesses. They distinguish between attitu-
dinal changes that are pro-business versus pro-market. Pro-market changes
favor entrants and consumers by removing impediments to markets. Pro -
2He also ﬁnds that the acceleration in growth of GDP from services is a gradual process
from 1980-81 to 1985-86.
3We shall incorporate similar rainfall adjustments in the next draft of this paper.
However preliminary investigations suggest that the longer-term nature of our approach
makes our results largely invariant to these adjustments.
4Balakrishnan and Parameswaran (2007) account for this ﬁnding by arguing that only
registered manufacturing breaks in 1982-83, while unregistered manufacturing breaks only
in the mid 1980’s. Because the share of registered manufacturing in GDP is small (8.7%
in 1982-83), they argue that this is unlikely to serve as an engine of growth.
5business changes focus on raising the proﬁtability of industrial and commer-
cial establishments and favors incumbents and produces. This shift increased
overall productivity. Rodrik and Subramanian use three measures related to
aggregate growth performance (real GDP per capita, real GDP per worker,
and total factor productivity (TFP)). Each of these variable displays a sharp
upward trend beginning in 1979. They also present simple Barro style cross
country growth regressions for the periods 1960 — 1980 and 1980 — 99. The
TFP regressions show that after controlling for policies, endowments, and
initial income, Indian grew 2.1% faster than the average country in the 1980-
99 period. They also show that the Indian TFP experience in 1980 - 89 has
surpassed that of East Asia even in the ﬁrst twenty years of the East Asian
miracle.
Other authors such as Wallack (2003) also support these ﬁndings. In
particular, Wallack (2003) ﬁnds evidence for a break in the GDP growth
rate in the early 1980’s. This is close to the result reported by Rodrik and
Subramanian (2005). Finally, Hausmann et al. have analyzed transitions to
higher growth in a large cross national sample, and date the Indian growth
break to 1982.
In Section 6 we show that our more disaggregated approach results in
alternative (and distinctly later) estimates of the turnaround in growth,
without resorting to any assumptions about exogenous break-points.
Although our paper is only tangentially related to the large literature on
convergence in Indian states (see for example Dasgupta et al. (2000), Datt
and Ravallion (2002) and Trivedi (2002)), it does provide some insights.
Several previous researches have concluded that there is evidence for condi-
tional convergence; but we suspect these results are due to biases in panel
estimation techniques. In Section 3.2 we present some simple graphical evi-
dence against both conditional and unconditional convergence; in Section 4
we show how our V-Factor analysis can be reconciled with this result; and
in Section 8 we discuss how our results can be consistent with convergence
of some states towards the global frontier, but lack of convergence between
the Indian states.
63 Some key features of the data.
3.1 The dataset
Our core dataset is a balanced panel of statewise real net domestic product
per capita for the 16 major Indian states, for all of which we have constructed
continuous series on an annual basis from 1960 to 2003.5 The 16 major states
that we analyse constitute 97% of the Indian population. We also have a
breakdown of the statewise total into 13 major sectors, also measured on a
real per capita basis. At present we only have a balanced panel of sectoral
level data from 1970 onwards. In a future version of this paper we plan to
extend these data at least back to the mid-1960s. The NSDP as well as the
sectoral data are from the Economic and Political Weekly (EPW) Research
Foundation statewise data set. Since the EPW research foundation does
not convert all data into a common base year, we have spliced all the NSDP
as well as sectoral data so that they are in 1993-1994 prices. We have also
corrected for changes in state deﬁnitions.
We also have data on a wide range of regional indicators on a state-
wise basis. Some of these, such as population, literacy, urbanization, are
drawn from census data and hence are only available on a decennial basis;
but we also have some other true time series data from at least the 1970s
onwards. To the best of our knowledge, our dataset as a whole extends and
encompasses all previous datasets relevant to macroeconomic analysis of the
Indian states (see, Ozler, Datt, and Ravallion (1996), Besley & Burgess
(2000)). This is in itself one of the novel contributions of this paper. A full
description of the dataset is given in the Appendix. We aim to make the
dataset publicly available in the near future.
3.2 Convergence between the Indian states?
To focus the analysis of the paper, we only brieﬂy summarise the nature
of the evidence on convergence between the Indian states.. It might be ex-
pected that unconditional convergence would be easier to observe at the
regional level than at the international level because of similarities in prefer-
ences and technology and the basic institutional and political environment.
Indeed, Barro & Sala-i-Martin’s (1992) original empirical results suggested
5We have recently acquired data to 2005; these will be incorporated into empirical work
in the next draft of this paper. See Appendix for a fuller description of the dataset.
7strong evidence of long-term unconditional convergence for the US states and
(somewhat less strongly) for EU countries. However, we ﬁnd that for Indian
states in our sample the evidence is both strongly against unconditional con-
vergence and almost equally strongly against conditional convergence to a
ﬁxed point in the cross-sectional distribution of income.
Figure 2


















Figure 2 illustrates the evidence against either form of convergence. It
plots real state income levels, relative to the average, in 1960 against the
same relative values in 2003. The chart also shows a line with unit slope
as a basis for comparison. Unconditional convergence would imply that the
scatter of points would tend to lie on a line with slope less than 1, since
all states would be expected to converge towards the average. Conditional
convergence to a ﬁxed point in the distribution would suggest that all points
should lie roughly on the line with unit slope. If anything the actual dis-
tribution of points appears to lie on a line with slope greater than unity,
implying that Indian states showed some tendency to divergence over this
period.6
6 These results are at odds with some recent research, which has tended to ﬁnd evidence
83.3 The time-proﬁle of statewise output per capita.
Figure 3. Log Real Output Per Capita in the 16 Major Indian States
Figure 2B shows total output per capita ﬁgures in logs (y) for the
sixteen states from 1960 to 2003. Even on the basis of visual inspection
there appear to be clear diﬀerences in the pattern over time. Some states
display what appears to be a clear break in trend near the mid-point of
the sample. The states appearing to show such a break are very diverse
in nature: Kerala (KER), Madhya Pradesh (MAP), Gujarat (GUJ) and
Rajasthan (RAJ) all appear to show a clear break. In contrast, an equally
diverse group of states appears to show no obvious break: for example, Bihar
(BIH), Haryana (HAR), Orissa (ORI) and Punjab (PUN).
Because log levels are usually assumed to be non-stationary, Figure 4
plots the log changes of real NSDP per capita. This provides a useful re-
minder that in this form, which should at least be much closer to stationarity,
for conditional convergence (see, for example, Dasgputa et al. (2000), and Trivedi (2002)).
However these results, largely based on panel estimation techniques, do not appear to
correct suﬃciently for known downward biases in coeﬃcients on lagged dependent variables
in panels, which in turn tend to overstate the signiﬁcance of rates of convergence.
9short-run volatility is such that longer-term shifts appear much less obvious
to the naked eye than those that appear to be present in the levels data.
Nonetheless even in the diﬀerenced data upward shifts in average growth
rates do appear to be visible in a number of states.
Figure 4. Growth of Log Real Output Per Capita in the 16 Major Indian
States
We shall show later in this paper that there is some doubt about the
precise timing of this break. Indeed, since the break has only been identiﬁed
ex-post any attempt to identify the timing precisely is in any case subject to
severe data-mining critiques. Nonetheless if we take a suﬃciently long-term
perspective there does seem to be good reason to place the breakpoint at
some point in the 1980s. Without prejudice to subsequent discussion about
precise timing, it is revealing to compare state-wise per capita growth rates
before and after 1985, as shown in Figure 5.7
7 A simple way to identify such a shift is by inclusion of dummy variables to capture
a shift at a particular date. If we run a simple panel regression of growth rates on a
10Figure 5
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The chart displays very clear dividing lines, both across time and across
states, which are most revealing if expressed in terms of convergence towards
the global frontier. As background data US per capita GDP grew at 2.5%
over the whole period, with only small diﬀerences between growth in the
ﬁrst and second sub-periods (2.6% vs 2.3%).8
Against this benchmark, which we can use as a reasonable proxy for
the global frontier economy, only three Indian states, Haryana, Punjab and
Orissa, showed any tendency to even marginal convergence in the ﬁrst sub-
period: they would be better described as just holding their own.9
The remaining states were all growing less rapidly than the frontier
- indeed some, like Madhya Pradesh, were barely growing at all - so that
almost all Indian states were to a greater or lesser extent, on the downward-
sloping part of the "V" shown in Figure 1.
For the majority of states the contrast in the second period could hardly
be any more striking. Eight states (Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka,
constant, and add a dummy variable that shifts from zero to unity in 1985, this is strongly
signiﬁcant on standard criteria. These are however clearly invalid on a data-mining based
critique since we have chosen the date to maximise its notional signﬁcance.
8 Source: Penn World Tables
9 Of these three states, Figure 2a shows that one, Orissa, had shown extremely rapid
growth during the 1960s, but then had ceased any tendency to converge. These results
are consistent with Datt and Ravallion (2002).
11Kerala, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal) had per
capita growth rates in the neighborhood of 4%, and were thus unambiguously
converging; a ninth, Madhya Pradesh, managed a very signiﬁcant shift in
growth, but by only enough to roughly hold its own relative to the US. In
the remaining states growth remained at a fairly similar rate to that in the
previous sub-period. Within this group two states, Haryana and Punjab
more or less maintained their relative position; but the remaining 5 states,
Assam, Bihar, Jammu & Kashmir, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh, continued to
lose ground.





























States with Break in Growth
States with No Break in Growth
Some recent research (e.g., Datt and Ravallion (2002)) has suggested
that it has been predominantly rich states that have beneﬁted from the
growth turnaround. Figure 6 demonstrates in a simple way that this is not
the explanation of the growth patterns shown in Figure 5. It compares the
average per capita income of the nine states listed above which did signif-
icantly increase their growth rates with the average ﬁgure for the 7 states
that did not. Given the way in which the two groups have been selected, it
should be no surprise that the former group displays a clearly kink-shaped
growth pattern, while the latter does not. But what is much more striking is
that in the early 1980s, when the growth turnaround appears to have taken
12place, the average income of both groups was almost identical.10
4A ﬁrst estimate of the "V-Factor"
A revealing way of capturing the diﬀerent growth patterns discussed in the
previous section is by a simple application of principal components analysis.
Following Bai (2004) and Bai and Ng (2002; 2004), we assume that longer-
term trends in output can be captured by a relatively small number of
common factors that determine permanent (i.e, unit root) movements, i.e,
a representation of the form
yit = βi0 + βi1F1t + ... + βikFkt + uit;i =1 ..N (1)
∆Fjt = a(L)εP
jt; j =1 ..k (2)
uit = b(L)εT
it; i =1 ..N (3)
where yit is log output in state i; the Fjt are common factors that are
subject to permanent shocks, the εP
jt; with the uit capturing the remain-
ing transitory dynamics.11 The state level transitory shocks, the εT
it may
in principle be mutually correlated. The βij are factor loadings on the
common permanent factors. a(L) and b(L) are assumed to be station-
ary polynomials in the lag operator (deﬁned such that for any variable xt
Lxt = xt−1) of the form a(L)=a0 + a1L + a2L2 + .... Bai (2004) shows
that as long as the uit are stationary, consistent estimates of the common
factors, and of the factor loadings, can be derived from the application of
static principal components analysis.12
Figures 7 and 8 summarize the results of applying this approach to the
16 per capita state output series. There appears to be quite strong evidence
that just two common permanent factors are suﬃcient.
10 Precise ﬁgures are given in Table 1 below.
11An alternative interpretation with an identical representation writes output for each
state as the sum of a permanent and a transitory component, where the innovations to
the state-wise permanent component are correlated across the states.
12 Bai and Ng (2004) outline an alternative approach which is consistent even when id-
ioysncratic components are non-stationary. In this approach principal components analysis
is applied to ﬁrst diﬀerenced data, and the resulting components are cumulated. When
this approach is applied to our dataset preliminary testing points to a larger number of
factors. These are again strikingly V-shaped, and strongly correlated in terms of longer-
term movements; but the larger number of factors makes interpretation more problematic.
We shall provide a more detailed comparison of this approach, and statistical tests of the
number of common factors, in a later draft of this paper.
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Figure 7 shows the ﬁrst two principal components. The ﬁrst captures
long-term common growth trends (indeed it looks extremely similar to the
cross-sectional average level of output). The second component, which has a
strikingly similar shape to that shown in Figure 1, provides our ﬁrst estimate
of a common "V-factor".
If we assume that these two factors alone provide a suﬃcient repre-
sentation of the common permanent components in state output, we can
construct estimates of transitory components in each state deﬁned by
b uit = yit −
³
b βi0 + b βi1 b F1t + b βi2 b F2t
´
. (4)
We show in the Appendix that for most, if not all states, the resulting series
appear stationary. This is conﬁrmed by formal tests which reject the unit
root hypothesis both (strongly) for the panel as a whole, and also for each
series in isolation.
14A striking feature of the two principal components shown in Figure 7
is that the low point of the second component, the V-Factor, appears to
correspond fairly closely to an apparent kink in the ﬁrst principal compo-
nent. The two components are, by construction, mutually orthogonal. But
if we are prepared to admit the possibility that the permanent innovations
in (2) may be correlated, we can straightforwardly specify the two factors in
(1) such that the "V-Factor" alone provides a suﬃcient explanation of the
diﬀerential shifts in growth performance summarized in the previous section.
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Figure 8 shows a simple rotation of the two factors, which sets F1t =
PC1t−αPC2t; F2t = PC2t, where the coeﬃcient α is deﬁned such that the
average growth of F1t in the samples 1960-1985 and 1985-2003 is identical.
With this speciﬁcation of the two factors, the ﬁrst factor explains long-term
growth in individual states, while the V-factor (≡ F2t) alone explains all
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Figure 9 shows the implied factor loadings on the V-Factor (i.e., the
b βi2t in equation (1)). The set of states with strongly positive factor loadings
exactly matches the set of states with clear shifts in growth rates shown in
Figure 5. The remaining states have factor loadings on the V-Factor close to
zero, or even, in the case of one state, Orissa, below zero. Since the majority
of states have strongly positive V-Factor loadings the V-Factor also explains
t h es h i f ti na v e r a g eg r o w t h .
It is perhaps worth clarifying that this representation, with two common
permanent factors, with diﬀerential factor loadings for each state, is consis-
tent with the evidence against convergence summarised in Figure 2. To see
this consider the representation of any arbitrary pair of states, i and j, given
the joint representation in (1) to (3), which implies
yit − yjt = βi0 − βj0 + uit − ujt +( βi1 − βi1)F1t +( βi2 − βi2)F2t. (5)
T h es u mo ft h et h eﬁrst four terms will be a stationary process given the as-
sumption (supported by the data in our panel) that uit and ujt are both
stationary. But given that the two common factors are non-stationary,
we would would only observe even conditional convergence if βi1 = βj1;
βi2 = βj2, ∀i, ∀j; while unconditional convergence would additionally re-
quire βi0 = βj0; ∀i, ∀j. In broad terms this suggests that long-term growth
16performance in the Indian states has (as we might expect) been hit by a
sequence of common permanent shocks. What is perhaps more puzzling is
t h a tt h e s es h o c k sh a v eh a dd i ﬀerential, and sustained diﬀerential eﬀects in
diﬀerent states. In Section 8 we attempt to provide some economic rationale
for this empirically driven representation.
Our two factor representation thus summarizes in compact form both
the relative and absolute growth performance of total state output. It does
so without making any assumptions about the date of any turnaround in
growth, which simply emerges from the data.13 We shall now go on to show
that this is a repeating pattern in a much wider range of output data.
5 The V-Factor in Sectoral Data
We have thus far focussed solely on total output; but it is also interesting to
examine the same factor decomposition at a sectoral level. Figure 10 com-
pares the ﬁrst two principal components of state-wise total output (15 series
in total14) with those derived from state-wise sectoral output (13 sectors in
15 states, hence 195 series in total). The results are strikingly similar.15
In one respect this is unsurprising, since if there is a common factor repre-
sentation on a sectoral basis, it must aggregate up (at least to a log-linear
approximation). But there is no guarantee that the factors that dominate
long-term movements in sectoral output will dominate the aggregate, since
in principle there might be signiﬁcant sectoral factors that cancel out in the
aggregate (e.g., if one sector were to systematically grow at the expense of
another across all states). However it appears that the growth factor and
the V-factor dominate at both the aggregate and sectoral level.16
13 Note that, while the rotation of the two factors shown in Figure 7 does, for conve-
nience, assume a break-point in 1985, this only aﬀects estimated factor loadings. It makes
no diﬀerence to the estimate of the V-Factor itself, nor to the total contribution of the
two factors.
14 We do not currently have sectoral data for Jammu & Kashmir; we do however aim
to add these in a future draft for consistency with total data.
15 Note that due to current data limitations we carry out sectoral analysis on data from
1970-2000.
16 This is borne out by unit root tests on sectoral output after stripping out the eﬀect
of the two factors from state-wise sectoral output levels, which indicate stationarity in the
great majority of cases.
17Figure 10












































TOTAL PC1 TOTAL PC2  ALL SECTORS PC1 ALL SECTORS PC2
This result is in some respects all the more striking because, while the
nature of the two factor representation remains clearly visible, its impact
is by no means uniform across sectors. Thus while some sectors appear
in general to have more signiﬁcant impacts of the V-Factor, there appear
to be important V-Sectors even in states where the aggregate eﬀect of the
V-Factor is close to zero (and, to a lesser extent, vice versa).
Given the multi-dimensional nature of the analysis, the detail of the
factor-based sectoral analysis is relegated to the Appendix. A few charts do
however provide some summary insights.
First, as background, it is helpful to be reminded of some straightfor-
ward sectoral growth accounting stylized facts. Figures 11 and 12 show the
contributions to total aggregate growth of ﬁve broad sectors over the two
ﬁfteen year periods, 1970-1985 and 1985-2000.17 Since the two periods are
of the same length the two charts are directly comparable, and hence are





which sums to the percentage change in the total if it is precisely equal to the sum of
components in both years. Due to data inconsistencies and shifts in base years the identity
does not hold precisely; however the chart shows that the discrepancies are fairly minor.
Private services are deﬁned as the sum of transport & communication, trade, banking and
insurance and other services.
18shown on the same scale. While output per capita grew by only between
zero and 40% in the ﬁrst sub-period, in the second sub-period it roughly
doubled in the majority of states.
Figure 11
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Agriculture Manufacturing+Mining Private Services
Real Estate+Construction Public Sector Total
* Total % Growth over 15 years to 1985 and Contributions 
Figure 12
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Agriculture Manufacturing+Mining Private Services
Real Estate+Construction Public Sector Total
* Total % Growth over 15 years to 2000 and Contributions 
Key features illustrated in the two charts are:
19• The growth up-turn in the latter period was, as is quite well-known
dominated by up-turns in growth in the (tertiary) service sector.18 But
even in the earlier period this sector was (at least relatively speaking)
already making an important contribution
• There were also signiﬁcant improvements across all sectors in most
states.
• While agriculture remains the dominant element in total output in
most states, it made at best only small contributions to growth in
either period. However, the latter period did at least see distinctly
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Figure 13 relates these features of the data to the factor representation.
It compares the sum of the factor loadings on the V-Factor for all 13 indus-
trial sectors in each state with those for output as whole. At the aggregate
level, states with high V-Factor loadings had more marked turnarounds in
growth. The sectoral counterpart to this is that in these same states the
V-Factor aﬀected more sectors, and with a typically higher weight.19 The
18 These results are consistent with Balakrishnan and Parameswaran (2007).
19 The total V-Factor loading is, up to a log linear approximation, a weighted average of
the sectoral V-Factor loadings, whereas the chart in eﬀect compares it with the unweighted
average; but this makes relatively little diﬀerence to the results.
20impact of the V-Factor was typically spread across a wide range of sectors.
The impact was however by no means uniform, whether across states or
across sectors.20
6 Dating the growth turnaround
In the preceding two sections we have established that we can derive a sat-
isfactory representation of state level per capita output, both in aggregate,
and at the sectoral level, in terms of just two factors: a growth factor and
a V-Factor. These can be constructed in such a way that the growth factor
has a roughly constant impact on output over time, while the V-Factor alone
explains the turnaround in growth.
Given this representation, an obvious question is when the turnaround
in growth actually began. As noted in Section 2, some past research has
suggested, on the basis of analysis of total output that there was a break
in growth early in the 1980s, or possibly even as early as the late 1970s.
This conclusion does not appear out of line with Figure 1, which compares
All-Indian output per capita with the same series for the United States. As
such, this result appears somewhat surprising, given the lack of any obvious
switch in policy that might have brought this change about.
Our own more disaggregated factor-based analysis suggests a rather
diﬀerent conclusion. The estimates of the V-Factor shown in Figures 7 and
10 have low points in the mid- to late 1980s - much more consistent with
what we know about the history of policy.
It would be tempting to claim that this more plausible dating of the
growth turnaround is due solely to superior statistical techniques. It is
indeed certainly the case that our analysis does draw on a much wider range
of data. The timing of the turnaround in the mid-1980s also appears quite
robust on our dataset. If, for example, we partition the dataset in diﬀerent
ways before deriving principal components, by using data for individual
sectors in all states, or for all sectors in a given state, in the great majority of
such partitioned datasets we also ﬁnd a V-shaped 2nd principal component,
with its low point in the mid- to late 1980s.
However, we would not wish to over-sell this conclusion, since an impor-
tant part of the explanation of the diﬀerences between our conclusions and
20 See Appendix for more detailed analysis of the sectoral factor loadings.
21those based on aggregate data can be ascribed to data discrepancies.
While state-wise output estimates are constructed using the same con-
ventions as the total ﬁgure, there are non-trivial discrepancies between the
All-India ﬁgure and the sum of the state-wise output ﬁgures. These dis-
crepancies, which can be ascribed only partly to the output of supra-state
bodies,21 are typically reasonably stable; however, the 1980s appears to have
been a period in which the discrepancy showed more signiﬁcant movements.
These make inferences about precise timing of the turnaround fraught with
diﬃculties.
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Figure 14 illustrates the nature of the problem. It compares the pub-
lished ﬁgure for log per capita output with equivalent series derived from
state-wise ﬁgures, both unweighted and population-weighted. The latter ﬁg-
ure is clearly the appropriate ﬁgure to compare with the All-India total, and
should in principle provide a good match, given that the 16 states in our
dataset include 97% of the population. However, the unweighted average is
what is relevant to our principal components analysis, which treats all states
symmetrically.
21 The items not covered in the NSDP numbers are (i) defence and other para-military
forces, (ii) government oﬃces abroad, (iii) foreign oﬃces of LIC and GIC, (iv) Bombay
oﬀ-shore activities, (v) deep sea ﬁshing and, (vi) net income earned from abroad.
22The ﬁgures typically move in-step with each other, albeit with non-
trivial diﬀerences in levels. However the chart shows that in the 1980s in
particular the discrepancies widened in a way that unfortunately clouds the
issue of the timing of the growth turnaround. All three series fell sharply
in 1980. The all-India ﬁgure then grew fairly steadily thereafter, while the
unweighted average of the state-wise ﬁgures levelled oﬀ during the mid-1980s
before picking up again sharply towards. To a reasonable approximation,
analysis of aggregate ﬁgures dates the growth turnaround at or near the
local minimum in 1980, while our disaggregated analysis dates it at a local
minimum in the mid-1980s which simply does not appear in the aggregate
data.22
We would argue that some degree of uncertainty about precise timing
is endemic to this type of analysis. Short-term volatility of growth rates
is very high in comparison to the magnitude of any plausible longer-term
shifts in growth, such that any signal is easily dominated by short-term noise.
However, over the longer term the reverse is the case, since long-term output
levels - which feed into our principal components analysis - are dominated
by average growth rates. The data thus provide much stronger evidence for
the existence of a long-term V-factor than they do for the precise location
of its low-point.
7 Correlates of the V-Factor?
Since we have established that our V-Factor can capture the major features
of the Indian growth turnaround both in aggregate and at a disaggregate
level, it would obviously be of considerable interest if we could establish
some causal factor, movements in which were correlated with the V-Factor.
We do not claim to have found any such causal factor. Indeed it would be
surprising if we had.23 Nonetheless, we can at least provide some preliminary
evidence of what correlates with, and (perhaps of equal interest) what does
not correlate with the V-Factor.
Inevitably, if frustratingly, evidence that we have on state-wise indica-
22 Note that the series in Figure 1 is also complicated by short-term volatility of US
output.
23 As a comparision, consider the amount of research eﬀort that has been devoted to
analysis of, for example, productivity movements in the United States alone, without
providing a clear-cut explanation in terms of causal factors.
23tors that we might hope to relate to the V-Factor is, more often than not,
only infrequently sampled - most notably on a decadal basis in census years.
For such series we simply do not have enough of a time series dimension to
enable a comparison with our estimates of the V-Factor. We can however at
least ask if the values of such indicators immediately before the low-point of
the V-Factor would have given some indication of which states were likely
to beneﬁtd i ﬀerentially from the turnaround. If nothing else this allows us
to dispense of some candidate explanations.



































ing % of 
NSDP
V-States 5337 44.7 2.2 196.5 27.9 10.7 49.0 26.4 39.6 16.9 9.9
Non-V States 5497 37.3 2.2 187.2 31.0 12.7 38.2 17.7 47.9 10.3 5.7
Table 1 shows values of a range of state-wise indicators in the census
year immediately preceding the turnaround. To summarize the data we split
state into the same groups as in Figure 6, which, given the V-factor loadings
in Figure 9 we can loosely characterize as "V- vs Non-V" states.24
If we focus initially just on the ﬁrst ﬁve columns of Table 1, the most
striking aspect of the data is just how little diﬀerence there was between
V- and Non-V states in terms of some important indicators, just before the
growth turnaround. As already noted in relation to Figure 6, just before
the apex of the V-Factor the two groups had virtually identical incomes
per capita. They also had fairly similar populations and virtually identical
population growth rates and investment rates, hence explanations based
on diﬀerences in neo-classical growth model parameters do not appear to
apply.25 As a proxy for supply constraints, initial electricity generating
capacity was also very similar
Moving further across the table we do observe at least some diﬀerences:
• V-States were on average more urbanised and more literate;26
24The analysis of Table 1 could of course equally well be carried out without reference
to the V-Factor per se. A future version of this paper will provide a more systematic
comparison of state-wise values of indicators such as those shown in Table 1 with state-
wise V-factor loadings.
25Although we should note the important caveat that statewise investment ﬁgures are
highly volatile, and are known to be prone to very signiﬁcant measurement errors.
26The diﬀerences in literacy are inevitably accentuated by the inclusion of Kerala (with
24• They were somewhat more industrialised, and somewhat less depen-
dent on agriculture;
• They spent somewhat less on development spending (revenue expen-
diture) than non-V states.
These ﬁgures are of course simply a snapshot, and therefore may not
tell us much about subsequent behaviour of individual states.
I nt h ec a s eo fs o m ei n d i c a t o r si n i t i a ld i ﬀerences did not correspond to
any subsequent correlation with the V-Factor, and thus seem unlikely to
provide any clues to causal relationships. A speciﬁc example of this type is
the share of registered manufacturing in total output. Table 1 shows that, in
line with the analysis of Rodrik & Subramanian (2005) a strong subsequent
growth performance of a given state appears to have been related to a high
initial share of registered manufacturing. But the detailed sectoral analysis
in the Appendix shows that registered manufacturing was not typically a
"V-Sector": i.e., while it enjoyed reasonably high average growth, it did not
experience any obvious turnaround in growth. Thus a relatively high initial
share of registered manufacturing appears to have been at best a catalyst
for better growth performance, not a deep causal factor.27
Some patterns do however appear to have had more long-standing eﬀects.
Figures 13 and A3 (see Appendix) show that agriculture typically had quite
low loadings on the V-Factor. Thus states with relatively high initial shares
of agriculture were in a less good position to beneﬁt from the impact of
the V-Factor. On the other hand the same charts show that private service
sectors typically had higher V-Factor loadings. While V- and Non-V States
had very similar initial shares of private services,28 we can at least guess that
their relatively higher levels of literacy and urbanisation shown in Table 1
may have given them a comparative advantage in capturing the beneﬁts of
the V-Factor in private services.
As already noted, apart from the sectoral output series we have relatively
few true time series on a statewise basis from which we can hope to extract
a literacy rate of 82% in 1981) in the V-States; however even excluding Kerala the average
literacy rate for the V-States was 45%.
27 This conclusion is indeed very close to the argument originally used by Rodrik and
Subramanian, who rationalised the apparent signﬁcance of the initial share of registered
manufacturing as symptomatic of an initial change in the emphasis of central government
policy in favour of relatively large-scale business.
28Deﬁned as in footnote 17.
25further clues. We can however point to two fairly striking features of the
data.
The ﬁrst is the role of the public sector. As already noted, V-states
were initially spending less (albeit only marginally on development spend-
ing). But this diﬀerential pattern also has its counterpart in subsequent
developments. Figures 12 and A3 show that the recorded output of the
public sector (which is largely driven by public sector employment) had an
average V-Factor loading close to zero. Perhaps more strikingly Figure A3
shows that state-wise V-factor loadings for the public sector were actually
inversely correlated with those for total output. Thus, V-states have tended
to decrease public spending since the 1980s, and non-V states have tended to
increase it. A very similar pattern is evident in development spending. This
is intuitive since following Ozler, Datt, and Ravallion (1996), we measure
development expenditures by revenue expenditures. Since the mid 1980’s,
many V-states (such as Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu) have de-
creased public spending on manpower (public employment) and increased
capital investments. This suggest that revenue expenditures are a symp-
tom of poverty, as supply constrained economies reduce capital investments
and increase revenue expenditures.29 Related to this, most infrastructure
projects require substantial ﬁxed costs. Such projects cannot be undertaken
unless a region has suﬃcient absorptive capacities and income is higher than
a critical threshold level. States with higher levels of income also have more
ﬁscal revenue to pay for more ambitious infrastructure projects.
A second striking correlation with the V-Factor shows up in one very
crucial aspect of the supply side of the Indian economy, namely electricity
generation. Table 1 showed that V-States had no signiﬁcant initial advan-
tage in this respect; however the subsequent proﬁle of this series shows a
distinct pattern across the two groups.
Figure 15 shows that the ﬁrst two principal components of per capita
electricity generation display the familiar pattern we have seen in output
data, with the second component providing yet another V-Factor. The signs
of factor loadings of individual states on the V-Factor for electricity match
extremely well (in 15 out of 16 states) with those of total state output
on the output V-factor.30 In a rich country this correlation would not be
29 See Ghate (2008) who constructs a median voter model of infrastructure investments
and regional divergence in the Indian context.
30 A caveat relating to this series in more recent years is that electricity transmis-
26especially interesting: indeed in some research on the US economy electricity
generation has been used as a short-term proxy for output itself. In the
case of India, where electricity supply interruptions are still common, the
correlation is less obviously trivial. Electricity supply is for some activities
close to being a binding supply constraint. The correlation between the two
V-Factors, and their factor loadings shows that V-states have typically been
better at progressively releasing themselves from this constraint.31
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sion across states has also improved acrosss t a t e sw i t ha ni n c r e a s ei ni n t e r - s t a t eﬂows
of electricity aﬀecting irrigation and agriculture positively. Thus statewise production of
electricity may over time become a less good proxy for statewise consumption, which is
what we would ideally like to measure, but for which we have much shorter and incomplete
samples of data.
31Nagaraj, Varoudokis and Venganzones (1998) also ﬁnd evidence that per capita total
consumption of electricity, and per capita industrial consumption aﬀect state economic
performance positively. However they conclude that the percentage of villages electriﬁed or
other physical infrastructure variables such as length of the railway network has no clearly
identiﬁable positive impact. We ﬁnd a similar lack of correlation in our own dataset.
278 T r y i n gt om a k es e n s eo ft h eV - F a c t o r
Can we rationalise the existence and ubiquity of the V-Factor, and the lim-
ited evidence we have of its correlates, with any underlying economic model?
We can get some insights into this question from considering a fairly general















where yit is log output per capita for state i ,t h esit and sIndia
s variables
captures factors that determine steady-state output relative to the frontier
represented by yUS
t , log output per capita in the United States, for indi-
vidual states and for India as a whole; TFPit and TFPUS
t is growth rate of
total factor productivity in state i and in the United States and εit captures
short-run cyclical factors.
As noted in relation to the discussion of Figure 5, to converge towards
US per capita output required growth greater than around 2% per annum.
Before the mid-1980s very few Indian states achieved this, and if so only
marginally. In contrast, since the mid-1980s the V-states have all been
converging (though at very diﬀerent rates); while non-V states have been
barely converging, or have continuing to diverge.
The simple framework of (6) oﬀers a range of possible ways of account-
ing for the all-India pattern; but not all such explanations are so readily
applicable to the relative performance of diﬀerent states.
It seems reasonable to argue that the sum of the last three terms on
the right-hand side of (6) is unlikely to provide an adequate explanation
of longer-term trends. In standard Cobb-Douglas type technology models
TFP growth shocks are common across all economies and hence cancel out
precisely. But even if they are country speciﬁc, such relative shocks might
reasonably be assumed to have a stationary distribution. The same applies
to the short-term error term, εit+1. Thus we need to look for an explanation
somewhere in the ﬁrst term.
One possible (and rather pessimistic) interpretation of the earlier period
was that the bracketed "convergence" term (the term multiplied by αi) was
on average close to zero - ie, that most, or possibly all Indian states were,
conditional upon the sit and sIndia
t processes, fairly close to their steady-state
28values. The downward drift in most states’ relative output levels would,
according to this interpretation, be interpreted either as a succession of bad
relative TFP growth shocks, or possibly (and even more pessimistically) as
a downward drift in sIndia
t .
It is harder to continue the logic of this explanation after the growth
turnaround. One obvious candidate explanation is that at some point in
the mid-1980s there was a shift in steady state output levels due to succes-
sive liberalisations driven by the centre. Many of these shifts were mani-
festly common across all states, hence it is reasonable to attribute them to
changes in the common Indian steady state factor sIndia
t . Given the subse-
quent doubling of growth rates (and an even more dramatic change in rates
of convergence), then, conditional upon a reasonable degree of stability in
the other elements on the right-hand side of (6), including rates of conver-
gence, the implied changes in sIndia
t must have been quite dramatic. Rodrik
and Subramanian (2005) argue that this is plausible because India was well
away from its production possibility frontier.
But since these changes were common across states, the great puzzle
presented by the diﬀerential impact of the V-Factor is why any such shift
in sIndia
t did not have largely symmetric eﬀects across the states. If we
are to pursue this line of explanation, we have to look for equivalently, or
even larger shifts in the state-speciﬁc sit factors that determine steady-state
output, ocurring more or less contemporaneously with the India-wide shifts.
It is hard to rationalise such dramatic shifts either on the basis of what
we know about diﬀerential statewise policy changes, or on the basis of the
very limited evidence we have presented of state-wise correlates with the
V-Factor.
But there is an alternative explanation of the same pattern which seems
somewhat easier to reconcile with both the all-India and statewise evidence.
The analysis of these shifts has implicitly assumed that the state-speciﬁc
rates of convergence, αi were both strictly positive and reasonably similar
across states. But an alternative explanation would attribute the pattern
of the evidence largely to the αi themselves. On this interpretation, and
consistent with the arguments of Rodrik and Subramanian, the bracketed
expression in the ﬁrst term was not necessarily close to zero in the ﬁrst
period; but failure to converge to the global frontier was largely due to the
αi being so close to zero that diﬀerences between actual and steady state
29income levels had essentially no impact. The turnaround in growth and
its diﬀerential pattern would then be attributed to some combination of a
common shift in sIndia
t and statewise diﬀerences in the αi. Ad i ﬀerential
impact of the all-India shock might be attributed to diﬀerent values of αi,
with non-V states, by implication, having αi values extremely close to zero,
thus closing oﬀ any convergence response.
But a further possibility is that the diﬀerential impact of the V-factor
reﬂects not just diﬀerential responses to common shocks to the steady states,
but also shocks to the αi themselves. One interpretation of convergence is as
a process of arbitrage, driven by international diﬀerences in factor returns.
Even in a frictionless model of convergence, low values of αi can reﬂect low
intertemporal elasticities of substitution, with the limiting case of αi =0
corresponding to an elasticity of intertemporal substitution of precisely zero
(Barro & Sala-Martin, 1992; Campbell, 1994). But models with frictions
can also generate similar results, even when the true elasticity is positive.
On this interpretation, the reforms of the 1980s and thereafter may not just
have raised steady-state output levels, but may also have reduced frictions;
with some states being better capable of exploiting the implied arbitrage
opportunity. In this interpretation all states might in principle ultimately
converge on very similar long-run output levels, but diﬀerential speeds of
convergence would imply that they would appear, during the course of this
process, to be systematically diverging, as Figure 2 suggests has been the
case.
9C o n c l u s i o n s
We have presented evidence of a common "V-Factor", derived from principal
components of both total and sectoral output levels for the Indian states,
that appears to capture well.long-term developments in both the absolute
levels of output per capita and its cross-sectional distribution. The V-Factor
appears to have its apex in the mid- to late 1980s, which is more consistent
with the history of policy than previous studies, such as Rodrik and Sub-
ramanian (2005) that have dated the turnaround to the beginning of the
1980s. Factor loadings on the V-Factor allow us to identify V- and non-
V states and industries; we have also presented some preliminary evidence
of correlates of the V-Factor. The diﬀerential performance of V- vs non-V
30states presents a puzzle to standard models of convergence if all states are
assumed to converge at roughly the same rate, but is somewhat easier to
explain if convergence rates diﬀer.
31Appendix
A Description of the Dataset
We utilize state level data from various state economic surveys, the Reserve
Bank of India, the Census, and CSO publications. We incorporate data from
the EPW Research Foundation (2005) dataset, the Ozler Datt and Ravallion
(1996) dataset , the Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE)
dataset, and the Besley and Burgess (2000) dataset. A full listing of all the
variables in the data set, their duration, and their sources is available from
http://www.isid.ac.in/~cghate/ chetanresearch.html. We brieﬂyd e s c r i b e
the key variables.
NSDP Data: The NSDP data have been assembled from various
tables in the EPW Research Foundation dataset. Our ﬁnal dataset includes
annual RNSDP (Real Net State Domestic Product) and PCRNSDP (Per
Capita Real Net State Domestic Product) observations for 31 states from
1960 - 2005. The observations have been spliced so that all states have
RNSDP ﬁgures in constant 1993-1994 prices. Our method of splicing ensures
that our measures of state RNSDP are largely immunised from the impact
of various changes in state deﬁnition.32
Population Data : The Population data has been tabluated from
Census ﬁgures, with a common compound growth rate applied across decadal
observations to impute annual observations for each state. We cross check
these ﬁgures with population ﬁgures obtained by simple extrapolation: (NRSDP/PCNRSDP)*
10000000. Both the Census ﬁgures and extrapolated ﬁgures are consistent
with each other. We also use the RURAL POPULATION and URBAN
POPULATION proportions from various rounds of the NSS surveys to give
us a full series of rural and urban annual population ﬁgures for 31 states
from 1960 - 2005.
Sectoral Data : We report sectoral (primary, secondary, and tertiary)
data for 16 major states (where available) using data from the EPW Re-
search Foundation. All data have been spliced so that the sectoral data
are in constant 1993-1994 prices. The variables are: Agriculture, Forestry
and Logging, Fishing, Mining and Quarrying, Manufacturing (Registered
32 These changes mainly aﬀect Bihar and, to a lesser extent, Madya Pradhesh and
Assam. Details of precise methodology are available from the authors.
32and Unregistered), Construction, Electricity, Gas and Water Supply, Trans-
port, Storage and Communication, Railways, Transport by other means and
Storage, Communication, Trade, Hotels and Restaurants, Banking and In-
surance, Real Estate, Public Administration, and Other Services
Development Expenditure Data : We combine data from the
Ozler, Datt, and Ravallion (1996) dataset with various state statistical ab-
stracts to get revenue expenditure shares of nominal state domestic product
from 1960-2000. This includes state expenditures on Education, Sports, Art
and Culture, Medical, Public Health & Family Welfare, Water Supply and
Sanitation, Housing, Urban Development, Agriculture and Allied Activities,
Rural Development, Irrigation & Flood Control, Energy, Industry and Min-
erals, Transport and Communication, Social Security, Welfare, and Roads
and Bridges.
Political Variables: We report data on the number of registered
trade unions, number of political parties in state governments, and state
wide representation in the Lok Sabha. These data are from various issues
of the Statistical Abstracts.
Rainfall Data : We report average monthly (from June to Septem-
ber) rainfall data, as well as the standard deviation of monthly rainfall data,
at the state level for 16 major states from 1960 - 2000.
Infrastructure V ariables: We report data on Commercially Con-
sumed Electricity, Electricity Consumed by Agriculture, Gross Electricity
Generation by Utilities, Gross Electricity Generation (Non Utilities), Rail-
ways density of route length per’000, sq km, Road density per ’000, sq km,
Motor Vehicles Density Per Sq Km of Geographical Area, Percent of un-
surfaced roads to total roads, and Circle—wise telephone exchanges. These
variables are for the 16 major states from 1970 - 2001.
Agriculture Land Usage: We report land usage data for agriculture
based on various land holding sizes: areas operated by marginal, small,
medium and large holdings, for 16 major states, from 1970 - 2003.
PublicFinanceData: We report state level public ﬁnance data for
16 major states from 1980 onwards from various issues of the state economic
surveys. These include the Gross Fiscal Deﬁcit, Revenue Deﬁcit , Primary
Deﬁcit, Own Tax Revenue, Own Non-Tax Revenue, Grants from the Center,
States share in Center’s Taxes, Revenue Receipts, Capital Receipts, Total
Tax Revenues, and State Tax — Net State RGSDP ratios. These data are
33f r o mv a r i o u si s s u e so ft h estate economic surveys.
B Transitory Components
Figure A1 shows estimated transitory components deﬁn e da si n( 4 ) .
Figure A1. Estimated transitory components (b uit) in statewise log real
output per capita
Tables A1 and A2 below show, respectively, ADF tests on individual
statewise transitory components, and alternative panel unit root tests. Table
A1 shows rejection of individual unit roots at below 10% probability levels
in 14 out of 16 states. Panel unit roots strongly reject unit roots whether
or not a common AR coeﬃcient is assumed under the alternative.
34Table A1, ADF tests
Series t-Stat Prob. Lag
ANP -4.47 0.00 0
ASS -3.31 0.02 0
BIH -2.39 0.15 1
GUJ -5.36 0.00 0
HAR -5.32 0.00 0
JAK -3.07 0.04 0
KAR -5.73 0.00 0
KER -2.51 0.12 0
MAH -4.29 0.00 0
MAP -6.62 0.00 0
ORI -2.84 0.06 1
PUN -5.08 0.00 0
RAJ -6.87 0.00 0
TAN -5.19 0.00 0
UTP -4.04 0.00 0
WBE -2.76 0.07 0
Table A2, Panel Unit Root Tests
Method Statistic Prob.**
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -10.75 0.00
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -12.95 0.00
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 225.91 0.00
PP - Fisher Chi-square 233.90 0.00
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root proces
Hadri Z-stat -1.87 0.97
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
C Sectoral Factor Analysis
While the main paper has focussed primarily on analysing the properties
of the V-Factor, it should be borne in mind that the greater part of the
long-term variation in output, both at the aggregate and at the sectoral
levels, is (by the very nature of principal components) attributable to the
ﬁrst factor, which we term the growth factor. Figure A2 compares sectoral
growth factor loadings alongside the loadings for total output, across all 15
states.
35Figure A2
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With a few important exceptions most sectors have grown over the long-
term, and thus most have positive growth factor loadings. But diﬀerential
loadings mean that the growth factor has also had important impacts on
sectoral distribution over time. The most marked exceptions to the general
pattern of positive growth factor loadings are agriculture and forestry, for
which loadings are typically close to zero or even negative At the other
extreme banking & ﬁnance typically has a high growth factor loading (even
in relatively slow-growing states) but appears less aﬀected by the V-Factor.
Figure A3 shows an alternative comparison. It summarises sectoral prop-
erties in terms of two key aspects of the factor loadings on both the growth
factor and the V-factor: the average loading of the sector across the states,
and the state-wise correlation of factor loadings for a given sector with the
pattern of statewise factor loadings for output as a whole.
The majority of sectors have positive loadings on both the growth factor
and the V-Factor. But there are some interesting exceptions. Agriculture
has on average low weightings on both. Registered manufacturing has a
reasonably high weight on the growth factor, but a negative (albeit near-
zero) weight on the V-Factor: i.e., it was a relatively fast growing sector
on average; but in contrast to most sectors it did not typically show any
marked pick-up in growth after the 1980s (this is also evident by looking at
the raw data).
36Figure A3
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Figure A3 also shows correlations across states between the factor load-
ings for individual sectors and those for total output. In general these are
reasonably (but not overwhelmingly) strongly correlated: i.e., the ranking
of the impact of both factors across states is fairly similar across sectors.
There is however one conspicuous exception: as discussed in Section 7 the
weightings of V-factor loadings for the public sector are inversely correlated
with those for output: ie, V-States typically had inverted V-factor patterns
of public spending, and vice versa.
Note that the data for the period 1970-2000 do not pick out such a
clear split between the states in terms of even the total V-Factor loading
as do those for the longer sample 1960-2003. This is driven by the diﬀer-
ence in sample, rather than the diﬀerence between total output and sectoral
loadings.
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